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Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus was detected in breeding 
turkeys on 2 farms in Valparaiso, Chile. Infection was asso-
ciated with measurable declines in egg production and shell 
quality. Although the source of infection is not yet known, 
the outbreak was controlled, and the virus was eliminated 
from the birds.
I
nﬂ  uenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus is a novel high-
ly transmissible agent that contains a unique combination 
of gene segments from different swine lineages (1); it has 
circulated in humans since April 2009 (2). First detected in 
North America, the virus was disseminated worldwide in 
just a few weeks, prompting the World Health Organiza-
tion to raise its global health alert to the pandemic stage 
(2,3).
By December 2009, a total of 14 countries had report-
ed that the pandemic strain was infecting swine, generating 
concern about the role of other susceptible species in the 
viral epidemiology. Fortunately, only a mild respiratory 
disease developed in the ill swine, and outbreaks were con-
trolled with biosafety measures, avoiding dissemination to 
humans and animals (4). In Chile, the ﬁ  rst case of human 
infection with the pandemic strain was conﬁ  rmed on May 
17, 2009; infection increased within 6 months to a total of 
12,276 cases, with 147 deaths (5).
On July 23, 2009, in the Valparaiso Region of Chile, 1 
ﬂ  ock (A1) from a commercial turkey breeding farm (farm 
A) started to show a measurable decrease in egg produc-
tion and shell quality (Figure 1). During the following 2 
weeks, similar signs were observed in 3 other ﬂ  ocks (A2, 
A3, A4) at farm A and 2 ﬂ  ocks (B1 and B4) on another 
turkey breeding farm (farm B) 50 km away, both belonging 
to the same company. However, neither respiratory signs 
nor increased death rates were observed. Because an inﬂ  u-
enza virus was suspected, on August 13 the situation was 
reported to the Chilean Agricultural and Livestock Service 
(SAG) for diagnosis.
The Study
On August 14, the ﬁ  rst blood samples were taken from 
turkeys of all affected ﬂ  ocks and submitted for serodiagno-
sis (Table). The agar gel immunodiffusion assay (AGID) 
detected antibodies to inﬂ  uenza A virus in 140 (62%) of 
227 turkeys sampled. Farm A had a higher proportion of 
positives (80%) than farm B (32%) (odds ratio [OR] 8.4; 
95% conﬁ  dence interval [CI] 4.6–15.5).
Because of this ﬁ  nding, SAG adopted several control 
measures. Involved premises were quarantined and bios-
ecurity standards were intensiﬁ  ed, an epidemiologic in-
vestigation of the outbreak was initiated, and postmortem 
examinations of some carcasses were conducted. Each 
farm was considered an epidemiologic unit because each 
contained several ﬂ  ocks located closer than 1,000 m in-
side the same farm and were managed under independent 
biosecurity measures. On August 16, sampling for viral 
RNA detection by real-time reverse transcription–PCR 
(rRT-PCR) (6) was conducted, including not only affect-
ed ﬂ  ocks but surrounding premises; cloacal and tracheal 
swabs and embryonated eggs were collected from hatch-
eries. In addition, neighboring turkey farms were sampled 
for serologic analysis.
By August 18, results of this screening showed infec-
tion only in breeder turkeys from the ﬁ  rst affected ﬂ  ocks of 
farms A and B. The rRT-PCR identiﬁ  ed RNA correspond-
ing to the inﬂ  uenza A matrix gene (Table) but not RNA 
of H5 or H7 genes. In some cloacal and tracheal swabs, 
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Figure 1. Average egg production of 3 pandemic (H1N1) 2009– 
infected turkey ﬂ  ocks (A1, A2, and A3) during July 20–August 20, 
2009, Valparaiso, Chile. Production was calculated as a daily egg-
laying rate (%).viral RNA was detected, with cycle threshold values of 
22.3–36.0. In the homogenates of embryo lungs and tra-
cheas, viral RNA was not detected, suggesting that no ver-
tical transmission occurred in this outbreak. Necropsies of 
3 birds showed salpingitis, peritonitis, and interruption of 
follicular development. No other lesions were observed, 
and birds that had symptoms at the beginning of the out-
break were recovering and returning to normal laying rates 
after 3 weeks (Figure 1). Pools of feces belonging to 12 
wild birds, including ducks (Anas georgica) and coots (Fu-
lica armillata), collected near farm A were negative for in-
ﬂ  uenza virus by rRT-PCR.
In addition, the SAG laboratory had been working 
on subtyping the agent by developing hemagglutinin and 
neuraminidase inhibition tests (7) using 5 AGID-positive 
serum samples. Subtype H1N1 was found after all 15 he-
magglutinin and 9 neuraminidase subtypes were tested.
On August 19, SAG authorities coordinated with the 
Chilean Public Health Institute (ISP) for the virus isola-
tion by using speciﬁ  c pathogen-free chicken embryos and 
MDCK cells (8) and for sequencing the viral genome (9) 
because the diagnosis for the pandemic agent was centered 
in the ISP facilities. In addition, an RNA sample was sent 
to the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (US De-
partment of Agriculture), the World Organization for Ani-
mal Health reference laboratory for avian inﬂ  uenza.
On August 27, the viral sequences had been informed 
by ISP and National Veterinary Services Laboratories (Gen-
Bank accession nos. GQ866230, GQ866231, GQ866229, 
GQ866225, GQ866227, GQ866226, GQ866232, and 
GQ866228), having an almost complete identity with the 
novel pandemic strain. These results suggested transmission 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus from humans to birds.
In the follow-up to this outbreak during September 
and October, SAG implemented an rRT-PCR assay devel-
oped by Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory (Athens, 
GA, USA) for the detection of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
N1 gene (10). When egg production began progressively 
recovering in ﬂ  ocks, cloacal and tracheal swabs were ana-
lyzed for viral detection by using rRT-PCR assays. The last 
evidence of infection was obtained on August 31 (Figure 
2), suggesting that the virus was eliminated from turkeys 
after 2–4 weeks.
Conclusions
The source of infection for animals is still under inves-
tigation, but no clinical signs consistent with inﬂ  uenza-like 
illness were reported in staff working on the farms. Viral 
dissemination might have occurred either from the same 
infectious source, i.e., a farm worker or through fomites 
transported between premises. In any case, the biosafety 
system implemented in the company was working mainly 
to prevent infections from wild animals but not from hu-
mans. Transmission among animals was expected to have 
occurred through direct contact with secretions and feces 
from infected to susceptible birds.
The low cycle threshold values found by rRT-PCR in 
some samples suggest that the virus can replicate in tur-
keys, although previous attempts to experimentally infect 
turkeys with this strain had been unsuccessful (10). Some 
unknown predisposing factor expressed in the farm envi-
ronment has transformed these birds into reservoirs of the 
pandemic strain. This event, also detected in Canada and 
the United States (4), could be explained by the reported 
presence of both avian and mammalian inﬂ  uenza A recep-
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Table. Laboratory results of testing conducted on turkey farms affected by the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza outbreak, Valparaiso
Region, Chile, 2009* 
Farm Flock  no. 
Results
Turkeys AGID  rRT-PCR 
No. Age, wk  No. animals sampled  No. positive No. animals sampled  No. positive  Ct
A 1 7,032 53 28 18 26 3 31.4
2 4,410 77 28 25 43 1 34.8
3 7,556 49 28 17 19 0
4 6,922 37 56 52 42 0
B 1 7,004 45 28 2 30 3 34.9
4 5,950 57 59 26 47 6 27.1
*AGID, agar gel immunodiffusion assay; rRT-PCR, real-time reverse transcription–PCR to detect matrix protein; Ct, cycle threshold values of positive 
results (averages). 
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Figure 2. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus detection rates (%) in affected 
turkey ﬂ  ocks from farms A and B during August 14–October 20, 
2009, Valparaiso, Chile. Tracheal and cloacal swabs were analyzed 
by real-time reverse transcription–PCR to detect matrix and N1 
genes. In each sampling date, detection rates appear in numbers, 
and sampled ﬂ  ocks are indicated by letters and numbers.Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Turkeys
tors in tissues from turkeys. Indeed, these turkeys are sus-
ceptible to a wide variety of inﬂ  uenza A viruses, includ-
ing those from wild birds and swine, which are detected 
in these birds frequently (11). The role of turkeys in the 
epidemiology of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 strain remains to 
be elucidated.
In this outbreak, the infection in turkeys was mild, 
with reproductive symptoms and natural recovery. Some 
authors have reported a similar situation when these birds 
were experimentally infected with the triple reassortant 
H3N2 subtype isolated from pigs (11,12). Because some 
segments of subtype H3N2 are in the lineage of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus (2), the genetic bases for the interspe-
cies transmission of this strain might be found on these 
segments. The turkeys involved in the outbreak were held 
under strict biosafety measures and sent to slaughter after 
laboratory veriﬁ  cation of viral disappearance. The control 
strategy promptly and completely eliminated the risk to hu-
mans and animals.
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Agricultural and Livestock Service and is a Food and Agricultural 
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